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Archive for the ‘Protests’ Category

Disasters in Soma

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The mining disaster in Soma has scraped off the shallow veneer of Turkey’s economic “miracle” and exposed its serious human costs.  The AKP launched the Turkish economy into the 21st century without adopting modern standards in labor laws and occupational safety.  Ironically, when speaking at Soma yesterday, Erdogan tried to put Soma in perspective by citing death tolls from mining disasters in other industrialized nations.  His main examples occurred during the last half of the 19th and first half of the 20th centuries.  Arguably his choice of statistics is more of a Freudian slip than a simple sign of ignorance.  The height of the industrial revolution in the west enjoys parallels with Erdogan and the AKP’s growth-at-any-cost mentality.

The AKP government has proven no better than previous governments at preventing man made or responding to natural disasters.  Multiple studies have shown that occupational safety conditions in general, and mine safety in particular, have not improved over the AKP’s time in government.  In fact, comparing a study of 1999 data to the latest 2010 TEPEV statistics reveals that the rate of fatalities per million tones of coal doubled in 10 years.  Both Turks and the international community alike have been happy to look the other way despite frequent and high profile fatalities.

Erdogan’s tone-deaf response to the disaster prompted angry crowds to mob and protest the Prime Minister in Soma.  Solidarity protests were organized in Istanbul, Ankara and other major cities across Turkey.  The scale of the disaster and the government’s botched response has led to the quotidian speculation that we are finally witnessing the fall of Erdogan.  At the moment the protests over the disaster remain small and local enough that once again gas and TOMAs will probably be enough to tamp down dissent.  Erdogan’s unsympathetic speech yesterday was similar in tone and content to a speech he gave in 2010 after another mining disaster.  His career was apparently unscathed by the 2010 speech, granted it probably did not receive as much publicity at the time.

However, I do think this incident is demonstrative of significant cracks in the facade of “national will” that the AKP has built around itself.  The Soma mine disaster’s significance lies in that it directly affects, and has angered, a portion of the AKP’s base constituency.  Even a usually staunchly pro-government paper has called for the Energy Minister’s resignation.  Yesterday was also the first time the grievances of (a portion) of the AKP’s supporters lined up with those of the student and residual Gezi protestors.  A series of botched government responses to natural or man-made disasters could possibly lead to a significant drop in AKP support. (Though there still remains the problem of the divided opposition…)

Soma will not single-handedly bring down the AKP but, like Gezi, it is one of a series of events that exposes the party’s waning political acumen.

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Written by ataturksrepublic

May 15, 2014 at 1:40 pm

A Death in Istanbul

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Yesterday Berkin Elvan, age 15, died in Istanbul.  He had spent nine months in a coma after being hit in the head by a gas canister when he went on an errand to buy bread.  His death sparked demonstrations at Turkish universities and cities around the country.  Many of the protests were quite large and resulted in violent clashes between police and protesters.

Berkin was a child bystander, making his innocence in his fate undeniable.  Thus far, PM Erdogan has remained silent on his death, though other high government officials, including President Gul, have expressed their condolences.  I will be curious to see how, if at all, Erdogan tries to spin this death so it is connected to one of his long list of enemies.  Perhaps we are about the see the uncovering of the bread lobby.

Like shoeboxes before it, bread has become a symbol of protest against the government.  As sociologist Zeynep Tufekci pointed out in her must read post on yesterday’s events, bread has a deep social significance in Turkey.  You quite literally cannot eat a meal in Turkey without an accompanying pile of bread.  Bread symbolizes life and nourishment in Turkey, more so than in other cultures.  The use of bread during demonstrations yesterday not only represents the circumstances of Berkin’s death, but his short life itself.

Since December 17, Turkey has been embroiled in a government corruption scandal in which both PM Erdogan and his son Bilal have been implicated.  Tapes of phone conversations between Erdogan and his son as well as high ranking members of the media and government are being gradually leaked on the internet via anonymous sources.  During one particularly infamous series of leaked phone calls, Erdogan is purportedly heard telling his son to get rid millions (it is claimed up to a billion) dollars in cash before investigators can find it.  Erdogan’s protection of his own son, while he was coldly complicit in the death of another person’s son, was an unspoken undertone in yesterday’s protests.  Berkin’s mother made the provocative statement that “It wasn’t God who took my son, it was Erdogan.”

As I wrote previously, Turkey has been on edge, just waiting for a spark to reignite the “resistance.”  It is too early to predict whether Berkin’s death will spark a demi-revolution a la Ukraine or fizzle out like many of the protests over the past year.  Berkin’s funeral, which his family has made a public event, is scheduled for 3 pm Istanbul time (9 EST due to daylight savings).  The reaction of the police to the crowds gathered to mourn will speak to the level of insecurity of the government.  A government that is confident of its control over its population and its hold on power does not tear gas the funeral of a child.

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March 12, 2014 at 12:04 pm

The Latest Round of Protests in Turkey

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Yesterday there were protests in at least 3 major cities in Turkey (Istanbul, Ankara and Antalya).  Protesters in Istanbul gathered to oppose the creation of more hydroelectric dams outside a hydroelectric power convention.  They were met with tear gas when they tried to enter the convention center.  The Minister of Forestry and Waterworks, who gave the keynote address at the opening of said convention, stated without any irony that “It’s impossible to understand those who oppose [Hydroelectric Power Plants]…It’s not right to oppose [these plants].”  In Ankara, protesters angry over the extended detention of suspects in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases marched toward the parliament building.  Police intervened in the protester’s progress  with water cannons, some of which were almost certainly filled with a mixture of water and noxious chemicals.  Photographs of these clashes between police and protesters in both Ankara and Istanbul bear an eerie similarity to some of the most iconic images from Gezi last year.

Though these protests are certainly significant expressions of the continued frustrations of a significant slice of the Turkish population, they are far smaller and less coordinated than the Gezi protests of last summer.  That being said, given the volatile atmosphere in Turkey right now, it would not be surprising if another series of coordinated protests broke out in the near future.  A trigger point like Gezi park could spark such protests, but the organic spontaneity of an event like Gezi makes it difficult to forecast.  However there are some Turkish holidays which are often the occasion for protests and could serve as a jumping off point for another round of nation-wide, coordinated demonstrations.  The most notable is May 1, Labor Day, which is widely marked by leftists in Turkey.  Commemoration of the holiday has historically centered on a rally in Taksim square.  Last year the Taksim rally was banned by the local government but unions and left-leaning Turks gathered anyway.  The resulting police-protester clashes were arguably a preview of the Gezi protests that started less than a month later.

The other 50% of Turkey has still not found a political outlet.  The continued police clashes with protesters critical of the government and suppression of the press has only added to the embattled mentality among those who don’t walk the AKP line.  The political, social and media outlets that should serve as a release valve for those with minority and opposition view points are being closed off.  Given this increasingly authoritarian atmosphere, it is certain there will be no shortage of protests in Turkey for the foreseeable future.

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February 14, 2014 at 3:48 pm

What Lies Ahead for Turkey

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The massive storm of scandal that has enveloped Turkey for the last several weeks has finally begun to ebb.  In its wake it has left three ministerial resignations, a handful of defections from the AKP, a massively reshuffled cabinet and over a thousand dismissed or reassigned law enforcement officials.  Analysts seeking to predict what lies in store for Turkey in the months ahead have focused primarily on two questions: Will Erdogan ultimately survive this scandal? (see here and here) and Will this incident end up strengthening or weakening Turkish Democracy? (see here here here and here)

It is indisputable that in the short term, Erdogan isn’t going anywhere.  He has utilized the same defensive strategy with which he rode out the Gezi Park protests; namely blaming foreign conspirators and agitators for sparking the incident while viciously clamping down on any public protests.  However Erdogan has not been successful in convincing all party members to echo his talking points.  One former minister who was not implicated in the scandal but who recently resigned from the AKP out of protest harshly criticized the Prime Minister’s interference in construction projects, saying that ” he never really quit the Istanbul mayor’s office.”  The Minister for Environment and Urban Planning, who was forced to resign as part of the scandal, went so far as to directly implicate Erdogan and call for his resignation.

Despite these damning words from former allies, not to mention the fact that his son has been caught up in the inquiries as well, Erdogan has loudly maintained his strategy and refused to quit.  We shouldn’t expect anything less.  Erdogan is nothing if not tenacious and stubborn.  He remains convinced, rightly or wrongly, that he has a precedent to rule and he is acting in the best interests of the Turkish people.  Even if evidence is uncovered that directly implicates him in construction bribery and graft, Erdogan will simply remain consistent in his blame of foreign plots and deep state actors.

The million dollar question is how will the events of the last several weeks affect the health of Turkish democracy.   Though undoubtedly the rampant corruption and collusion between the AKP and the Turkish construction industry needs to be addressed, some have expressed concern about the fact that the Gulen Movement is likely driving the current probe.  The Gulen Movement is believed to count among its members a significant proportion of the Turkish police and judiciary.  The firing and reassignment of hundreds of police officers involved in the scandal investigation is just the latest effort of the current government to purge the Movement from positions of power.  Though the Gulen Movement’s penetration into the Turkish government is hard to accurately ascertain, the fact that the government has been able to punish with impunity so many law enforcement officials for pursuing this corruption investigation leads me to believe that Gulen’s power has been over estimated.  It is certainly a poor sign for Turkish democracy that this investigation was at least partly motivated by revenge against the government by a shady private organization.  However, at this point I believe that it is even more concerning that every attempt to further the corruption investigation is immediately shut down.

Unless we see another dramatic twist in this saga, for better or worse the Gulen Movement probably will not serve as an outside check on the AKP government.  However, like many Turks, the Movement may be putting their faith in the upcoming election cycle to do the job for them.  Turkey has held free and fair elections for decades and over the next year and a half or so there will be 3 important votes.  The first, coming up in March, is for local governments and is widely expected to act as a much needed gauge of the AKP’s current popularity.  This summer the first popular election for the important but largely ceremonial office of President will take place followed by parliamentary elections next summer.

Though much to Erdogan’s chagrin the presidency still does not wield significant power, the race for this office will in some ways be a crucial junction for the AKP administration.  According to AKP party rules, Erdogan cannot serve another term as Prime Minister.  However, it is eminently clear that he does not want to give up power and go quietly into the night.  Since his plan to become an “American Style” president has failed, Erdogan has two options if he wants to stay in power: he can run for President or change the party rules and serve another term as Prime Minister. Health of Turkish democracy will be able to be gauged by the challenges or lack thereof that Erdogan will face when embarking on either of these paths.  Current President Gul, who more popular among the Turkish citizenry than Erdogan, has not given any clear indication as to what his future political plans are.  If both run for President or Prime Minister another nasty intra-AKP war is likely to break out.  However, given that the lack of current significant challengers to the AKP, this kind of fight could ultimately serve to break the AKP’s current hegemony.  The highly respected scholar of Turkey Erik Zurcher recently wrote a convincing piece arguing that we may be seeing the beginning of the end of the AKP.  A Gul challenge to Erdogan could facilitate this and, in a best case scenario, lead to a new conservative party purged of many of the more extreme elements that have poisoned the party’s once admirable platform in recent years.  Even if it does not come from Gul, a challenge to Erdogan must come.  There is no need to elaborate on the fact that allowing Erdogan to change the AKP party rules and continue to remain Prime Minister would be a very bad blow to Turkish Democracy.

The possible retrial of those convicted in the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer cases* adds a wild card to this already complex mix.  Erdogan is trying to poison the reputation of the Gulen Movement by placing blame for all the shady elements of the trials on them.  He is also using the possibility of a new set of trials as a public demonstration that the AKP no longer needs the help of the Gulen Movement in order to keep the secular establishment at bay. However it is anyone’s guess as to whether the retrials will happen and, given the recently proposed law which would effectively muzzle the  judiciary, what the outcome will be.  I worry that Erdogan may under the illusion that he can convince the military that Gulen Movement acted without the knowledge of the government.  I think the possibility of a fully reinvigorated military remains remote, but it would be dangerous to assume that the leash on the military could be loosened without it attempting to reestablish at least some of their former power.

An investigation into the unholy relationship between the AKP government and the Turkish construction sector has been a long time in coming.  Any savvy Turk or Turkey watcher will tell you construction graft and bribery have been an open secret for years now.  The government reaction to the scandal has seriously undermined the independence of the police and the judiciary, and in following the at least temporarily tightened the AKP’s hold on power.  However, Turkey has faced far worse challenges in much more fragile periods of its democracy and yet has continued to slowly but surely progress in its political development.  2014 is going to be a tough year for Turkey but the demonstrated resilience of the Turkish people and their commitment to democracy should make even the most hardened cynic pause before diagnosing a mortal wound to Turkish democracy.

*The AKP and Gulen movement are generally believed to have worked together during these cases in order to neuter the secular-military establishment.

Written by ataturksrepublic

January 8, 2014 at 9:02 pm

Don’t Panic

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The AKP has been making some insane policy threats lately.  These statements have (justifiably) caused an uproar from many Turks and Turkey watchers.  However, I think we all need to take a step back and consider the possibility, or probability, that despite their current vice-like grip on Turkish politics, the neither Erdoğan nor the AKP in general have the power or mandate to carry through with many of these proposed “reforms.”  It is too early to predict the long-term consequences, but Erdoğan’s antics seem to be backfiring and causing even some former supporters to question his leadership.

The first piece of good news is that Erdoğan is not going to get his wish to become the first American-style President of Turkey anytime soon.  The commission tasked with reforming the current constitution, which was created by the generals in the wake of 1980 military coup, has fallen apart.  The AKP had already agreed in August not to push for a presidential system to be included in the new constitution.  Turkey still desperately needs a more liberal constitution but the AKP does not seem to be ready to make the concessions needed to make this happen.

Erdoğan’s rhetoric over the past year has necessitated almost non-stop damage control from the other high-ranking members of the current administration, namely President Gül, Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç .  It appears that at least Arınç is getting sick of being the PM’s apologist.  He publicly made statements both during the Gezi protests and the recent co-ed housing controversy that clearly articulated his opposition to the Erdoğan’s position.  In an act of censorship shocking even in Turkey, critical statements Arınç made regarding PM Erdoğan were censored by the state TV network, which Arınç himself is tasked with overseeing. There were even rumors that Arınç would be quitting politics after both controversies but it seems he will be staying in government at least until the 2015 elections.  Gül, who in some polls rivals Erdoğan’s popularity, has not been as confrontational in his opposition.  However, many of his speeches as of late has notably contradicted Erdoğan on the same talking points.  Gül very well may be trying to distance himself from Erdoğan in anticipation of the 2015 elections.  There has been much speculation as whether Gül will run for Prime Minister or continue to occupy the position of President, but it is too early to tell.  What is clear is that Gül wishes to maintain his reputation as a moderate figure amongst the increasingly polarizing voices coming out of the AKP.

Erdoğan’s antagonism isn’t just limited to within in the party.  For reasons that are not quite clear to even experts on the subject, Erdoğan has begun a campaign to close down the private extra-curricular “cram” schools that have become a fixture of the Turkish educational landscape.  This proposal is clearly directed at the Gülen movement, who control about a quarter of these institutions.  The Gülen Movement’s followers generally fall within the AKP’s core demographic.  However, since the Gezi protests the movement’s leader, Fethullah Gülen, has made some official statements that could be interpreted as critical of the current government’s increasingly conservative bent.  The announcement of Erdoğan’s intention to close down study centers has started a war of words between Gülen and Erdoğan.  The impact of this rupture between arguably the two most powerful figures in Turkey is hard to predict, if for no other reason than the secretive nature of the Gülen Movement has left its scale largely unknown.

The fight against the closure of privately owned schools has already been taken up by groups outside of the Gülen Movement.  These “cram” school have become an indispensable stop-gap in the inadequate Turkish educational system.  Though the constitutional court is expected to overturn any law that would ban them, the damage has already been done.  Erdoğan once again has stubbornly continued to insist that these schools need to be closed, despite widespread public outcry and protests against such a measure.  The issue of education touches all segments of Turkish society, thus this issue may have a greater impact on the AKP base than the Gezi protests.  The opposition within the AKP has already been apparent.  One AKP minister who opposed the proposed prep school closures quit the party on Saturday after being actively marginalized and threatened with an internal disciplinary measures.

Loudly and publicly declaring the intention to implement politically or legally impossible reforms is par for the course for the AKP.  The direction of the latest round of the perennial threats to reconvert the Istanbul Hagia Sophia into a mosque illustrates this trend nicely.  At a speech marking the occasion of a new carpet museum on the premises November 16, Bülent Arınç stated that “we currently stand next to the Hagia Sophia Mosque … we are looking at a sad Hagia Sophia, but hopefully we will see it smiling again soon.”  Then last week it was reported that former monastery turned mosque turned ruin  in another part of the old city would in fact be soon renovated and opened as a mosque.  This property just happened to be administered by the Hagia Sophia Museum.  As I have stated previously, any real attempt to turn the Istanbul Hagia Sophia into a mosque would be an international and domestic political disaster.  However, this latest announcement regarding the monastery seems to be part of a quiet campaign to turn lesser known Byzantine churches into mosques, often without the knowledge or support of the local community.  Similarly, Erdoğan and the AKP may talk of instituting extremely conservative social policies, but the best they can do now is chip away at laws affecting only the very secular population (such as those associated with the sale of alcohol).

Significantly, the latest controversies, mostly sparked by Erdoğan, have begun to touch the pious majority.  No political party has yet emerged that could rival the AKP’s currently numbers.  However, if a combination of the opposition parties could together take a chunk out of the AKP’s 50%, the hegemony of the AKP could be greatly diminished.  The regional elections in March 2014 will give us a better sense of how the social and political unrest has affect the AKP’s popularity.  In the meantime we should take the AKP’s policy threats with a grain of salt, but continue to watch for attempts to institute conservative social policies in small but significant ways.

Written by ataturksrepublic

December 2, 2013 at 6:49 pm

Erdogan gets it wrong, again

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The fight for public input into “public” projects has moved from Gezi, Istanbul to ODTÜ, Ankara.  For the last several months the Middle East Technical University (acronym ODTÜ in Turkish), has been the scene of fierce protests against the construction of a road by the Ankara municipality through its campus.  Paralleling Gezi, the ODTÜ protests have centered around the environmental destruction the construction would cause, specifically the clearing of a large number of trees.  The ODTÜ protesters have also been subject to violent police intervention.

Over the weekend the struggle between the protesters and the local government escalated to a new level.  The University administration had joined the fight against the construction of the road, attempting to legally appeal the construction plans.  The University was apparently assured that construction would be halted until the appeals process was completed.  However, it appears that Friday night the municipality began clearing the forested area where the proposed road will run without notifying the University.  The University has issued a statement outlining its interpretation of the events and threatening legal action.  The AKP mayor of Ankara, Melih Gökçek claims that the Friday night construction blitz also came as a surprise to him.  However, he went on to defend the construction, stating that there were no legal obstacles to its continuation.

PM Erdoğan has also become involved in the controversy.  Discussing the issue on Tuesday he stated that “Everything can be sacrificed for roads, because roads are civilization. But those who are not civilized do not know the roads’ value. In our values, roads do not recognize any obstacle. Even if there is a mosque in front of a road, we would demolish that mosque and rebuild it somewhere else.  We won’t stop because somebody says so. Bandits used to block roads in the past, now modern bandits are blocking the roads.”

Erdoğan’s statement reveals that he still believes that he is facing an uprising of the old Kemalist secular elite.  However, later on Tuesday,  #direncami started trending on Twitter in Turkey.  The term diren (resist) became the term used for protesting or “occupying” during the Gezi uprisings.  The tag #direncami (resist mosque) is a twitter protest against the theoretical threat of Erdoğan to destroy a mosque in order to build a road.  The Turkish tweeters were signalling that Erdoğan missed the point entirely.  The protesters at ODTÜ are not calling for equal opportunity destruction but a cessation of all arbitrary destruction.

Whether or not Erdoğan would actually support the destruction of a mosque in order to build a road is largely beside the point (though I seriously doubt he would).  However, this statement should be a wake up call to his conservative Muslim supporters.   Erdoğan is willing, at least in theory, to sacrifice a symbol of the values that he supposedly holds most dear to the god of “progress.”  With his latest statement the Prime Minister has provided further proof that the popular uprisings in Turkey are not an example of secularists fighting against an encroaching Islamism, but about civil society fighting against an encroaching authoritarianism.

A Turkish Liberal Democrat?

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A true liberal democrat is a rare species in Turkish politics but it appears that they do in fact exist.  Last week I attended a talk by a Turkish MP from Bursa Aykan Erdemir.  Erdermir is an interesting figure: a young Harvard PhD and former professor who was elected as  a CHP MP from the AKP dominated district of Bursa in 2011.  His talk, titled “Prospects for Pluralist Democracy in post-Gezi Turkey” painted a clear-eyed picture of the causes of the Gezi protests and real problems Turkey faces if it is to become a truly liberal democracy.

Erdemir identified a number causes that worked in conjunction to create popular uprisings in Turkey this summer.  He believes demographic changes that Turkey has been undergoing for the last several decades are central to growing political discontent.  The shift from large, extended families to small, nuclear ones has changed a formerly heavily patriarchal society into what he dubbed a “child-archal” society.  Erdemir believes that the patriarchal state is out of sync with the changing family dynamic; a dynamic which has resulted in an more individualist world-view amongst the younger generations.  He also mentioned the population shift from rural to urban areas, the growing export based economy and the increasing educational attainments of the average Turk as factors that have resulted in a significant societal shift.  Erdemir emphasized the ubiquitous of technology in Turkish society, specifically the use of smart phones, which has created greater access to larger world and competing ideological view points.

Erdemir quite rightly observed that this trend toward greater engagement with the world and intellectual pluralism cannot be “undone.” However, he identified a number of challenges facing those who wish to promote greater liberalness in Turkish society.  The Turkish State has few checks and balances and is becoming more efficient and competent and the bureaucracy is expanding.  This is bad news for groups such as the Gezi protesters as the government has more coercive power without any internal mechanism to check it.  Erdemir also discussed the phenomenon of the increasing conflation of the State and the ruling party in the minds of both those in power and the Turkish masses in general.  The ruling party has also engaged in what he termed “state capitalism” or “clientalism” but could also be given the cruder moniker of crony capitalism.  Erdemir also criticized the government for its censorship of the media and the increasing surveillance of citizens.  He did not criticize capitalism itself however and made a connection between market freedom and political freedom.

Erdemir did not shy away from another problem with a more personal connection: the lack of a credible opposition to the AKP.  He was optimistic about some of the changes his own party has undergone since Kemal Kilicdaroglu became chairman in 2010 but said that the party was only about halfway to where it needed to be.  Erdemir does not think that there will be a massive shift in favor of the CHP next election and believes that Turks would prefer the AKP with new leadership in place.  Clearly this is a reference to the more moderate Gul potentially replacing Erdogan as Turkey’s premier (either in the form of Prime Minister or a more empowered President).

From his district of Bursa, Erdemir has been able to observe what the more conservative elements of society think about the Gezi tumult.  Growing out of an Islamist past, the AKP has been criticized in recent years by numerous observers (including myself) for failing to remember the state oppression they fought against for so long and co-opting the same repressive measures of the previous, strictly secular governments.  Erdemir reported that at least some of the ordinary conservatives in his district were sensitive to the fact that the oppressed seemed to have become the oppressors.  He found that those ordinary Turkish conservatives were disillusioned to a certain extent by the events of this summer and expressed that this is not what they wanted from the AKP.

Erdemir emphasized multiple times that the CHP was a “social democratic” party but mentioned nary a word about the party’s “eternal chief“.  The CHP is officially a socialist party, in that it is part of the Socialist International association of political parties.  Interestingly,  Erdogan’s newest yes-man Yigit Bulut recently made headlines in Turkey for asserting that Erdogan is a “true socialist.”  This seemingly out of the blue comment could have been an awkward attempt at undermining the appeal of the CHP (though it was quickly dismissed by the official party spokesman).

In regards to the difficult regional problems Turkey is coping with, Erdemir criticized the “adventurous” foreign policy that the Turkish government has pursued over the last few years. As Assad himself recently warned, Erdemir believes Turkey’s funding of Syrian militants and the increasingly sectarian nature of the Syrian conflict could come back to haunt Turkey.  However, He also believes that Turkey can not be a democratic “island” in the sea of increasing chaos in the region and there needs to be a promotion of democracy in the region.  To quote: “You can’t be a democracy with Al-Qaida as your neighbor.”

From this talk as well as in his other media appearances and commentary in English, one can conclude that Erdemir is a rare true liberal in Turkish politics.  However, my Turkish is not good enough for me to fully analyze how he presents himself to a domestic audience.  I of course want to believe that there are real democrats in the Turkish government, but remain skeptical until I can get a good report on Erdemir’s rhetoric and reputation in Turkey.  If you are someone who is thus informed, please let me know about the “Turkish” Erdemir in the comments!

Written by ataturksrepublic

October 4, 2013 at 8:10 pm