Posts Tagged ‘PKK’
I have a new piece in Muftah today on the evolving conflict between Turkey and IS, and Turkey and the PKK.
You can check it out here: Turkey’s War against the Islamic State is also a War Against the PKK
I wanted to add the following addendum on the motive and timing of the end of the Turkey/PKK ceasefire.
I don’t believe that the Suruc bombing was manufactured by President Erdogan or any other facet of the Turkish government or military as an excuse to renew hostilities with the PKK. However, I do believe that Erdogan is seizing the opportunity that has presented itself in order to play some very cynical domestic politics. In addition to the obvious military and national pride motives behind the PKK airstrikes, it is very possible that, as Turkey technically has no government (coalition talks are still technically ongoing), President Erdogan is taking advantage of the moment in an attempt to allow the AKP to win back its majority in a fresh set of elections. Renewed hostilities between the PKK and Turkey could very well serve to alienate the Turkish voters which helped the Kurdish HDP party break the election threshold in June and bring back nationalist voters which had deserted the AKP for the more extreme nationalism of the MHP. If this is the case, and we will know soon enough, then Erdogan will have proved he is willing to sell out Turkish peace, security and prosperity for the hope of holding on to his unchecked power and further isolating Turkey’s Kurdish population.
Saturday night to Sunday the Turkish military carried out an operation into Syria to evacuate its remaining personnel at the tomb of the grandfather of the founder of the Ottoman Empire, Suleyman Shah. Before they left, they removed the remains and destroyed the building. These events came on the heels of rumors that the Turkish guards stationed there had been trapped by the Islamic State, rumors the Turkish foreign ministry denied Friday. The Kurdish PYD forces which control a defacto autonomous region in northern Syria aided this operation by allowing the Turkish military to pass through their territory on the way to the tomb and after the operation was over set up a new Turkish enclave in their territory to house the recovered remains.
Much was written about the history and importance of the Turkish enclave in Syria back in the Fall when the area was first overrun by ISIS- you can read more here and here. Certainly the tomb had/has symbolic significance for Turkey, especially fervent nationalists, and the decision to evacuate it may have political repercussions domestically. However, the transfer of the enclave to another location inside of Syria seems to be a satisfactory solution to the dilemma of how to protect Turkey’s pride while also relieving a dangerous flashpoint. What is most interesting and most consequential for the future policies are the specifics of how and when this operation was executed.
For long time Turkey watchers, one of the most striking elements of this story is the fact that not only did the Turkish military cross through PYD territory, and specifically the recently besieged town of Kobane, and that they are also allowing Turkey to reconstitute their enclave on their territory. The Turks and the Kurds have a fraught history, to put it lightly. During the siege of Kobane, Turkey was heavily criticized for not intervening on the side of the Kurds and the frustrations of Turkish Kurds boiled over into deadly riots. This act of cooperation between the PYD and the Turkish military initially hinted at the possibility that Turkey is seriously changing its attitude toward what now seems like the inevitable reality of living with an autonomous Kurdish enclave on its southern border. More cynically, the current Turkish government could use its cooperation with the PYD to try to win back the political support of Turkish Kurds, who in the past supported the AKP in significant numbers.*
However, the political posturing that has come in the wake of this operation complicates the picture significantly. President Erdogan’s spokesman vehemently denied today that there was any cooperation with the PYD and called them a terrorist group. The PYD has stuck to its frankly far more believable claim that they coordinated with the Turkish military and the operation could not have been a success without such cooperation. The PKK for its part has suggested that Turkey must have notified and coordinated with the Islamic State as well in order to have evacuated its troops so smoothly. IS denies the PKK’s claims.
After official government communications showed and spoke of PM Davutoglu personally directing the Suleyman Shah operation on Saturday, today the President’s office claims that it was in fact Erdogan who personally oversaw it. It was also announced today that Erdogan will be chairing the next Cabinet meeting, something that it is within the powers of the presidency, but was only done in extraordinary situations in the past. This flexing of political muscle on the part of Erdogan could perhaps indicate a rift between himself, the Prime Ministry and/or the military. The potential to convert this successful operation and its aftermath into political gains with Turkey’s Kurds seems high, and Erdogan’s instance on burning bridges strikes me as shortsighted.
Meanwhile, whether it was preplanned or not, Turkey’s parliament took advantage of the distraction provided by the Suleyman Shah operation to Wag the Dog. The AKP members of parliament pushed through 10 parts of the controversial and illiberal security bill in an all-night session Saturday. As could be expected, the Turkish military incursion into Syria is top billing in the news today, rather than the legal encroachment on democratic freedoms.
*The upcoming June elections are a linchpin in the ruling AKP’s plans to amend the constitution to make President Erdogan the du jour instead of just the de facto head of state. The Kurdish party in Turkey, the HDP, has decided to run candidates in the upcoming election not as independents, as it has done previously, but as officially affiliated with the party. According to the election rules, if the Kurdish party fails to gain 10% or more of the total votes in the election, it will not be able to seat any of its members. The seats that it theoretically did win will go to the runner up in any given election, most likely the AKP candidate. Therefore, the future ambitions of Erdogan and the AKP are tied closely to how Turkish Kurds vote.
The Islamic State is advancing on the Kurdish city of Kobane in northern Syria. Turkish Kurds and Kurdish refugees still huddled around the boarder are rioting. The take away of most international media observers can be paraphrased as “the Kurds are unhappy because Turkey is purposely letting Kobane fall.” As with most Turkish politics, the truth is much more complex.
Turkey is genuinely stuck between a rock and a hard place when it comes to Kobane. Both the Syrian Kurdish leadership and the Assad government have flatly said that they would consider a Turkish military incursion into Syria a hostile act (although the position of the Kurdish regional government may be changing). About half of Turkish citizens are opposed to intervening against IS. Erdogan and Davutoglu are absolutely right when they insist that a half-hearted air campaign will never succeed in fully defeating IS and that a multi-lateral strategy is need. None of these issues of course excuses Erdogan’s equating the PKK (which the Turkish government has been in peace talks with for the year and half) with IS (which kidnapped dozens of Turkish citizens and has called Erdogan in infidel). Nor does it justify tear gassing Syrian Kurds trying to cross back into the Kobane region to help defend the city. However, it does explain why Turkey has knowingly given the US and the Syrian Kurds an impossible to fulfill set of demands that would need to be met before it would agree military cooperation against IS. This is also why Turkey will continue to urge the US to use airstrikes on IS and lash out against the US for not doing enough to stop IS, while simultaneously blocking the usage of the US airbase in Turkey for such a purpose.
Kurds are indeed frustrated with both the US and Turkey for what they believe is the former’s unwillingness to provide sufficient air support for Kobane and the later’s all but open support of IS. Both of these accusations are oversimplifications, but the tense situation right now means perception matters more than the truth. The political dynamics between Turkey, its Kurdish citizens, its Kurdish Syrian refugees and the Syrian Kurdish regional government complicates issues further. The Syrian Kurdish government does not want its previous autonomy disrupted by a partnership with or military intervention by Turkey. As Harold Doornbos, a reporter currently on the Turkish-Syrian border tweeted yesterday “There are some misconceptions, especially among Western audiences, regarding Turkey ‘doing nothing’ and ‘just watching how Kobane dies’ [sic]… Kurds [are] angry at Turkey NOT b[ecause] Turkish army does not intervene in Kobane, but b[ecause] Turkey blocks weapons, fighters from reaching Kobane.” Kurds in both Turkey and Syria are upset at what they perceive, accurately, as Turkey’s double standard when it comes to Syrian fighters. After letting Islamists cross the border essentially unimpeded for years, Turkey is now denying this same privilege to Kurds. Granted the greater border security has much to do with the rise of IS, but Turkey’s decision to prevent unarmed young Kurds, both Syrian and Turkish, from traveling to Kobane since this battle started has led many Kurds to perceive Turkey’s new border security as more anti-Kurdish than anti-IS.
Kurds began protesting in cities around Turkey and around the world Monday and on Tuesday night in Turkey these protests morphed into riots. Kobane is the spark, but frustration has been building for some time among Turkey’s Kurds. The Turkish-Kurdish peace talks have been stalled longer than they have been productive. The AKP government gave Turkey’s Kurds hope that they would finally enjoy equal cultural rights with Turks, only to have these hopes met halfway at best and indefinitely delayed at worst. Turkey was forewarned multiple times by Kurdish leaders that an IS victory in Kobane would lead to renewed Kurdish violence. Anyone with even a cursory knowledge of the situation should have been able to see these riots coming. The Turkish government should have also been able to predict that Kurdish protests, peaceful or not, would be met be counter-protesters from Turkey’s ultra-nationalist and extreme fundamentalist groups, all of which are known for their involvement in past violence. Whether out of malicious intent or simple stupidity (and again, Kurds will perceive it as malicious) the Turkish government seems not to have taken any steps to prevent or assuage the violence. Many police were off duty due to the holiday over the weekend and were only recalled once the violence peaked. Once again, citizens have reportedly been killed and seriously injured by police actions. Perhaps more disturbingly, the police failed to prevent multiple deadly clashes between Kurdish citizen and political groups and one or more extremest political groups. Reports indicate at least 14 dead (update: 18) most the victims of the inter-group clashes.
Some Turkey watchers have raised concerns that we may be seeing a return to the bad old days in Turkey- armed clashes between rival political groups, renewed PKK insurgency and government emergency rule. It is too early to make any solid predictions, but the events of the last few days have put the gains that Turkey has made during the AKP decade under serious threat, even more so than its recent slip toward authoritarianism. A return to unpredictable violence does not just threaten Turkey’s democratic institutions, but its economic and growth and social stability, the foundation on which the AKP has built its power. It is the best interest of all groups involved, the Kurds, the AKP and the Turkish nation at large for the Turkish government to find a way to deescalate this explosive situation. The first step is to address it’s pro-IS reputation. The Turkish government must stop simply saying that it does not support IS and find ways to demonstrate this stance, such as providing non-military aid and allowing Kurds to cross into Kobane to help defend the city. The government must also clarify its position on the PKK. As long as the PKK is engaging in military actions against the Turkish government, it makes no sense for the government to maintain that it is equivalent to IS. If the PKK and its members have no chance of being rehabilitated, what motivation do they have to hold the ceasefire? Of course, an Erdogan apology for this statement is out of the question, but Davutoglu or other government officials need to find a way to modify or qualify this comparison. Only if Turkey’s Kurds stop perceiving the Turkish government as the enemy, and vice versa, will there be any hope for a return to peace and stability.
Some very harsh light has been cast on Turkey and its malignant neglect of its ISIS problem over the past week. Turkey joined the US led coalition against ISIS only to almost immediately backtrack. Whether or not this was the right decision for Turkey to make, and in the long term I believe it is not, is complex and the subject for another blog post. In addition, investigative reports, in Newsweek by A. Christie Miller and Alev Scott and in the New York Times today by Ceylan Yeginsu, have made it clear that ISIS has successfully convinced thousands of vulnerable Turks and Turkish Kurds to join their nascent state. Miller, Scott and Yeginsu’s reporting has not only proven that Turkey’s boarders remain dangerously porous but also reveal that despite Turkey’s notorious internet censorship and surveillance the Turkish government has neither been able to identify potential ISIS recruits nor stop ISIS propaganda. Why Turkey has not stopped virtual ISIS infiltration is again the subject for another blog post.
Turkey’s undoubtedly serious ISIS problem has diverted attention from the fact that is still also facing a serious, and continually growing, refugee crisis. In addition to the more than a million Syrian refugees already residing in Turkey, ISIS’s rampage through northern Iraq has driven yet another wave of refugees into Turkey, the Yazidis.
The vast majority of Syrian refugees in Turkey are outside of the highly lauded refugee camps, living mostly in Turkey’s southern cities or in Istanbul. Syrian refugees have swelled the population of cities like Reyhanli, Killis and Gaziantep. Despite the largely welcoming attitude of the Turkish population toward the refugees, recently tensions have been rising. In August there were violent anti-Syrian protests in Istanbul and riots targeting Syrians went on for several days after a Turkish landlord was murdered by his Syrian tenant in Gaziantep. In order to try to prevent even more Syrians from entering the country, Turkey has encouraged the building of refugee camps just inside the Syrian border. The conditions in these camps are decidedly worse than the camps located inside of Turkey.
After Kurdish fighters pushed back the ISIS invaders which had displaced and killed thousands of Yazidis, members of this religious minority began fleeing over Turkey’s southeastern border. Official estimates put the number of Yazidi refugees at 16,000. Camps are being set up for this new refugee group but like the Syrians many find themselves living either in ad-hoc shelters or in camps inside Iraq.
Yazidis are an ethno-religious minority whose religious beliefs are widely misunderstood. Yazidis follow a syncretic religion that is based on pre-Islamic, Pre-Christian Zoroastrian beliefs. They speak Kurdish dialects and most (but not all) consider themselves to be ethnic Kurds. Muslim Kurds for their part appear to embrace Yazidis as their ethnic kin, fighting heroically to allow trapped Yazidis to escape from the barren Sinjar mountain and even training Yazidis who volunteered to fight against ISIS. Kurds inside Turkey have gathered donations and personally delivered necessities to Yazidi refugees.
The Turkish government is already overwhelmed trying to manage the Syrian refugees inside its borders. It needs a new strategy in order to effectively manage and accommodate a vulnerable refugee group like the Yazidis. I wrote an unpublished policy paper last fall addressing the issue of Turkey could better accommodate other ethno-minority refugees, specifically the Alawite and Alevi refugees from Syria. The data is somewhat dated, but the essential argument I make still stands. In brief, I assert in this paper that the most productive and efficient plan of action for Turkey regarding minority urban refugees is to work with Turkey’s own indigenous Alevi and Alawite minority communities to provide services to these refugee groups. This proposal is doubly beneficial. It not only addresses the problem of these under-served refugee groups who are hesitant to ask for assistance directly from the Turkish government but also, in working together to address the needs of refugees, it also would build trust between the Turkish government and its long marginalized Alevi and Alawite citizens.
This proposed plan of action can be directly translated for the current situation of Yazidis, who have taken refuge in Turkey’s largely Kurdish southeast provinces. Kurdish municipalities and individuals have been providing aid independently but do not have the resources to deal with a crisis of this scale in the long term. The Turkish central government on the other hand has the resources but not the contacts on the ground. In order to address this crisis effectively, the two need to work together. Additionally, the Turkish-Kurdish peace process, while not yet broken, has stagnated. Partnering with local Kurdish authorities and civil society organizations to asses and address the needs of this latest group of refugees would be just the kind of good-will initiative that the peace process so desperately needs right now. The Turkish government needs to set aside its phobia of everything Kurdish (read: anything with the remote possibility of being affiliated with the PKK) and directly engage with all willing partners in order to both manage this crisis and demonstrate that there can be a lasting peace between Turks and Kurds.
However, I can almost without a doubt predict that Turkey will continue its current plan of action, or lack there of, regarding both Iraqi and Syrian refugees. Over the past year Turkish efforts to address both Sunni and minority Syrian refugees have flatlined. The only discernible change stems from disconcerting reports that urban refugees, particularly those begging on the streets, have been rounded up and sent to camps against their will. I have yet to see any investigative reports regarding these camps, if they do indeed exist. I certainly hope that when the current crisis cools down that both the Turkish government and the media will realize that the Syrian refugee crisis is turning into a permanent population displacement. Sending refugees to camps is not a long term solution, no matter how good the conditions in said camps may be. Major policy changes, such as issuing work permits for refugees, need to be paired with creative grass-roots based solutions in order to prevent Turkey’s refugee population from becoming a major, and likely long-term, social, economic and political burden.
Yesterday a tragic incident provided proof that Gezi is far from over. Many of the facts surrounding the event are still in dispute, but what is clear is that during the course of a protest in Antakya early Tuesday morning, 22 year Ahmet Atakan died. His death triggered renewed protests across the country, including Istanbul, Ankara and the AKP stronghold of Bursa. Istiklal Boulevard in Taksim was once again the scene of police intervention with tear gas and water cannons.
Though eyewitnesses report that the protests were smaller than those at the peak of the Gezi uprising this summer, the renewed clashes between police and civilians is an important and potentially dangerous sign. Many reports state that Atakan died during a protest related to the previous death of a Gezi protester. However, some also mention that the protest Atakan participated in was against Turkey’s involvement in Syria’s civil war. Whether or not Atakan went out with the intention of protesting Turkey’s current and future involvement in Syria, his death is perfectly poised to exasperate an already tense situation.
Atakan’s hometown Antakya is located in a small peninsula of Turkish territory that sticks down like a thumb into Syria. The area has a proud history of religious and ethnic diversity, even through the periods of ethnic cleansing that homogenized much of the rest of Turkey during the 20th century. However, the Syrian civil war is putting a strain on both inter-communal relationships and the relationship between the citizens of the province and the Turkish government. Potentially making this situation even more explosive, Atakan was apparently an Arab Alawite, the ethno-religious group to which Assad belongs. Most Alawites both in and outside of Syria continue to support Assad’s government, if for no other reason than they fear the consequences for their community if the rebels prevail. So far the Alawite community in Turkey has largely kept a low profile, but this death could energize the community to lash out against the Turkish government or even Sunni refugees and fighters from Syria. Resentment of Turkey’s unofficial involvement in the Syrian civil war is not isolated to the Alawite community. Polls consistently show that the majority of Turks are against further intervention in Syria. The bombing in Reyhanli earlier this summer, which was assumed to be connected to the Syrian regime, already demonstrated the potential for retaliatory attacks against Syrian refugees in Turkey.
In addition to it’s involvement with the Syrian war, Turkey is also currently confronted with another extremely delicate internal situation. A few days ago, the much hailed peace process between the Turkish government and the PKK broke down. The Turkish government has claimed that the PKK has not withdrawn enough of its fighters from Turkish territory and now the PKK has stated that it will halt its withdrawal until progress is made on the issue of Kurdish cultural rights. Ethnically Kurdish areas generally refrained from participating in the protests this summer. However, there were representatives of the Kurdish BDP party at Gezi and the movement in general has shown itself to be sympathetic to the issue of Kurdish rights. If the protests we witnessed on Tuesday result in a revived Gezi movement, Turkey’s frustrated Kurdish minority may find this an opportune moment to revive protests for their rights as well.
The Turkish government has a potentially explosive situation on its hands. In the case of the Gezi protests of this summer, the repeated use of force by the police encouraged protesters to seek out creative non-violent ways to continue their resistance. However, if the government chooses to meet minority protesters in Turkey’s south with violence, past experiences demonstrate the potential for prolonged, deadly conflicts to erupt.
Despite their concurrence with the Kurdish Peace Process in Turkey, the Occupy Gezi protests initially took little interest in the struggle of Kurdish Turks. Though there were signs of a Kurdish presence in Taksim and Gezi, the vast majority of Kurds have chosen to watch from the sidelines. However, as the Gezi movement has moved forward it has begun to make some historic connections with the Kurdish movement, even as the Turkish government has begun to retreat from the peace process.
Despite the turmoil in Turkey’s major cities over the past month, steps in the peace process between the Turkish government and the PKK have continued on schedule. The “Wise People” commission finished their tour of Turkey and reported back to PM Erdogan with suggestions on how to continue the detente with the Kurds. The PKK has been busy with step 1 in the process, moving its guerrillas out of Turkey and into the Kadil mountains of Iraq; the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) claims that 80% of PKK fighters have already left Turkey. As a result the PKK has begun demanding that Ankara institute promised reforms such as the right to Kurdish-language education and lowering the 10% electoral threshold for parties to be included in the parliament.
Despite the unprecedented initiative on the part of Erdogan and the Turkish government to begin this peace process, the past week produced some worrying developments. In contrast to the BDP, Erdogan claims that only 15% of PKK fighters have left Turkish territory, the implication of course being that the PKK has not fulfilled their end of the bargain. In addition, he seems to be full out refusing to even consider implementing promised reforms, step 2 in the outlined process. In a speech last Wednesday, he claimed that the government has “no plans” to lower the 10% election threshold or to provide “mother tongue” education for minorities. His related pronouncement that “the only official language is Turkish” hearkened back to the Kemalist nationalism that was instrumental in creating the Kurdish resistance and the PKK in the first place.
On Friday, protests over a perceived government violation of the peace agreement turned deadly. In the largely Kurdish Lice district in the province of Diyarbakir, protesters clashed with the Turkish army over the building of a new gendarme outpost. One young man was killed and a number of other seriously injured when members of the military opened fire on the
hostile crowd. *(eyewitness reports suggest that the government’s version of events exaggerated the violence of the protestors)
This incident is extremely worrying but so far the PKK seems hesitant to retaliate. Currently the PKK appears to more eager to see the peace process succeed than the Turkish government. Indeed Turkey’s Kurdish population has much more to lose from the failure of the peace than the Turkish government or average Turkish citizens. While Turks of all stripes protested in cities across the country over the past month, the Kurdish south-east has remained almost eerily quiet. Many have interpreted the lack of protests in Kurdish-majority areas as stemming from a desire to avoid giving the government any excuse to back out of the peace process. There are likely other factors at play as well. The Dutch journalist Frederike Geerdink who is based in the largely Kurdish city of Diyarbakir, argues that the Kurds do not feel a need to participate in the Occupy Gezi movement, even if they sympathize with the protesters. Their “protest” started with the founding of the PKK and has been ongoing ever since.
In contrast, as the protests have gone on those involved have begun to take more and more of an interest in the Kurdish struggle. The protests have brought together Turks of all different lifestyles, political affiliations and ethnicities and created an arena for them to not only interact but forge bonds in a struggle against mutual enemies. The hugely important fieldwork conducted by Turkish sociologist Zeynep Tufekci in the midst of the protests in Gezi and Taksim has documented this culture of pluralism and tolerance. One of the outcomes of Gezi’s nurturing of plurality is the first time large numbers of Turks are fully comprehending the grievances of the country’s Kurds. After the incident in Lice, crowds gathered in various locals in Istanbul on Friday night in a solidarity protest. They applied the same terminology to the Lice (diren Lice) as has been utilized in the Gezi protests and chanted pro Kurdish slogans. As Tukekci observes “This would have been hard to imagine a month ago.”
A great number, if not a majority of Turks have a negative and even hostile view of Kurds. They have been raised to believe in the centrality of Turkish ethnic identity to the survival of the Turkish nation-state. Though Kurds make up the majority of the victims of the Turkish government’s war against the PKK, thousands of Turkish soldiers have also been killed. Turkey still requires all its young men to complete mandatory military service. Their military training and experience in the field has served to reinforce the idea that Kurds are the enemy to a generation of young men (and their families). However, Occupy Gezi has introduced the “other 50%” to the grievances of the Kurds in a very personal way. It is too early to make any predictions as to how Occupy Gezi will affect the outcome of the Kurdish peace process and vice versa. The Kurdish cause could very well give the Gezi movement the legs it needs to keep going now that its initial, Weberian “charismatic” stage seems to be coming to an end. No matter if the Lice protests in Istanbul end up being an isolated incident or not, I am optimistic that the pro-Kurdish protests by Turks is a sign of a cultural shift among at least some elements of Turkish society. After experiencing a month of insults, violence, and pro-government media coverage, I suspect that the “resistors” and their supporters will have trouble believing the official government line on aspirations of the Kurds and the inherent evil of the PKK.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the last two days have been of historic importance for Turkey. First, as anticipated, the imprisoned leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan made a Nowruz declaration calling for a cease-fire and reconciliation with Turkey. Then today, in a quite unexpected turn of events facilitated by President Obama, PM Netanyahu of Israel apologized to PM Erdogan over the phone for the death of Turkish civilians in the Mavi Marmara incident.
The cease-fire declaration by Ocalan is an indisputably important gesture toward real, lasting peace between the Turkish government and its Kurdish minority. But the question remains will the Turkish government do its part to bring about this reconciliation? As I previously argued, I believe that PM Erdogan has the power to end the Kurdish insurgency. There have already been a number of articles which outline the obstacles which still must be overcome before the cease fire can be deemed a success. Factors such as disarmament and amnesty are certainly extremely important in the short term. However, the only way to ensure that the peace between Turks and Kurds lasts is to grant Kurds all of the political, cultural and linguistic rights that they demand, without exception. Any lingering rights issue has the potential to fester into renewed insurgency. Of course fully and legally acknowledging the rights of Turkeys’ Kurdish minority is not without its risks. Turkey’s violent and vocal far-right ultra-nationalists will never accept the right of non-Turkish and non-Sunni groups to live freely in Turkey. Turkey must carefully monitor these extremists to be sure they do not sabotage the peace process, but their reaction must not be given undo consideration. Turkey must continue to move forward in giving all its citizens equal rights even if there are groups that wish otherwise.
The apology from Israel is situated perfectly (perhaps purposely given the fact that Davutoglu and the Foreign Ministry were circumvented) to maximize Erdogan’s popularity and therefore his power to orchestrate the rapprochement between the Turkish government and the PKK. Some have worried that if Erdogan appeared too eager to placate the Kurds and Ocalan, he risked alienating his conservative Turkish base. However, the Israeli apology is the perfect bone to throw to his supporters. If Erdogan does not take advantage of this moment to do everything he can to ensure a successful peace process between Turkey and the PKK, then he truly never was committed to peace in the first place.